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COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE OR
PROSECUTORIAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: TIME FOR
CHANGE
Victor Manolache*
INTRODUCTION
On January 11, 2013, Aaron Swartz hung himself.1 Swartz was 26, and
despite his youth, was already a well-known and accomplished
programmer. Most notably, Swartz helped develop Creative Commons, and
his company Infogami merged with Reddit.2 Many prominent computer
programmers and scholars considered Swartz a genius and a friend, and
mourned his death.3 Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide
Web, reacted to Swartz’ death saying “Aaron dead. World wanderers, we
have lost a wise elder. Hackers for right, we are one down. Parents all, we
have lost a child. Let us weep."4
Almost two years to the day before his death, on January 6, 2011,
Swartz was arrested in connection with a series of network break-ins of
MIT’s computer system. The break-ins spanned a few months and Swartz
carried them out from a storage closet on MIT’s campus.5 Between
September 2010 and January 2011, Swartz, a Harvard graduate student at
the time, physically entered MIT campus, and from a storage closet,
hooked up his computer to MIT’s network. He spoofed his ID on the
network to remain undetected and downloaded millions of academic
journals from JSTOR.6
On July 11, 2011, a Federal grand jury indicted Swartz for wire fraud,
computer fraud, unlawfully obtaining information from a protected
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computer, and recklessly damaging a protected computer.7 The charges
carried a maximum sentence of 35 years in prison. Swartz refused a plea
deal, and on September 12, 2012 Federal prosecutors added nine more
felony counts under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”)8,
increasing the maximum prison time to 50 years.9
In all, Swartz was charged with two counts of wire fraud10 and eleven
violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.11 Usually, wire fraud
charges involving computers are prosecuted along with the CFAA.12 Thus
the essence of the prosecution’s case depended on their interpretation and
application of the CFAA.
Reaction to Swartz’ death was very opinionated, dividing legal
scholars and prompting a public debate about whether Swartz was
overcharged13 – or whether he even committed a crime to begin with.14 At
Swartz’ funeral, his father, Robert Swartz, condemned the prosecution,
saying "[Aaron] was killed by the government, and MIT betrayed all of its
basic principles."15 Prosecutor Carmen Ortiz declined to comment, but her
7.

Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, is Dead
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9.
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http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-01-17/the-overzealous-prosecutionof-aaron-swartz (strongly expressing that the prosecution should not have charged
Swartz), accord, Jennifer Garnick, With the CFAA, Law and Justice Are Not The
Same: A Response to Orin Kerr, THE CENTER FOR INTERNET LAW AND SOCIETY
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10:00
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14. See Lessig, Prosecution as a Bully; See also David Boeri, Retired Federal Judge
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Over
Handling
Of
Swartz
Case,
WBUR,
http://www.wbur.org/2013/01/16/gertner-criticizes-ortiz-swartz
(interviewing
retired federal judge who stated: “Just because you can charge someone with a
crime, just because a technical crime has been committed, doesn’t mean you
should”).
15. Sandra Guy, Aaron Swarz was ‘killed by government,’ father says at funeral,
CHICAGO
SUN-TIMES
(Jan.
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2013),
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husband replied through Twitter, writing: "Truly incredible that in their
own son's obit[uary] they blame others for his death and make no mention
of the 6 month offer."16
Perhaps Robert Swartz’ words were an emotional reaction by a
mourning father, but many legal scholars’ reaction targeted the CFAA’s
harsh criminal treatment of Swartz in light of an intrusion that was neither
malicious nor prolonged.17 Jennifer Garnick, director of Civil Liberties for
the Center of Internet and Society at Stanford Law School wrote: “The
CFAA is incredibly broad and covers swaths of online conduct that should
not merit prison time.” A former criminal defense attorney and friend of
Swartz’, Garnick concluded: “Exactly because the CFAA arguably applies
to Aaron’s alleged actions, it should be amended.”18
Others differed. Professor Orin Kerr19 believed the charges were based
on an appropriate reading of the law.20 But Kerr recognized that the CFAA,
in its current form, lead to undesired outcomes: “The problem raised by the
Swartz case is ... [that] felony liability under the statute is triggered much
too easily. The law needs to draw a distinction between low-level crimes
and more serious crimes, and current law does so poorly..."21 The back and
forth correspondence, publicized through blogs and online editorials22
differed in sympathy expressed towards Swartz, but agreed in principal that
the CFAA no longer worked well as a viable, well-balanced, computer
crime statute.
Originally, the CFAA created three federal crimes limited to federal
16. Karen McVeigh, Aaron Swartz: husband of prosecutor criticizes internet activist’s
family,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
15,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jan/15/aaron-swartz-husbandprosecutor-criticises.
17. See Lessing, Garnick, Carter, Boyce supra note 13.
18. Jennifer Garnick, Towards Learning from Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2, THE
CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY (Jan. 15, 2013 3:54 PM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/01/towards-learning-losing-aaron-swartzpart-2.
19. Orin S. Kerr is a nationally recognized computer crime law scholar, and current
George
Washington
Law
School
professor,
See
http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=3568 (last accessed December
19, 2013).
20. Orin Kerr, The Charges Against Aaron Swartz (Part 1: The Law), THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2013 2:50 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/14/aaronswartz-charges/ (“I think the charges against Swartz were based on a fair reading
of the law. None of the charges involved aggressive readings of the law or any
apparent prosecutorial overreach. All of the charges were based on established case
law”).
21. Orin Kerr, Aarons Law, Drafting the Best Limits of the CFAA, And a reader Poll
on A Few Examples, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 27, 2013 11:46 PM)
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/27/aarons-law-drafting-the-best-limits-of-thecfaa-and-a-reader-poll-on-a-few-examples-part-i/.
22. See supra note 13 at 2.
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interest computers. Those crimes were: accessing national security
information, private financial information, or a computer owned by the US
Government without authorization.23 A federal interest computer was any
computer on which national security or private financial information was
found.24
The CFAA’s scope has been expanded through revisions. Today, the
CFAA is over-inclusive of criminal activity, creating over-criminalization
that is only checked by prosecutorial discretion. There are two reasons for
this. First, Congress never defined “authorization.” This creates vagueness
and has resulted in a Circuit split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuit.
Second, the CFAA is a bright line rule with no exceptions.25
This Note shall explain both problems and offer a possible solution to
each. Section I discusses the history of computer crime law. Section II
presents the circuit split and offers a solution. Section III discusses
consequences of the CFAA’s bright line approach. Section IV proposes an
amendment to the CFAA that creates an exception for types of uses that,
although unauthorized, should not merit criminal prosecution. Swartz’ case
is revisited, and the discussion from the previous sections is applied.

I. HISTORY OF COMPUTER CRIME LAW
A. Pre-CFAA
Computer misuse prosecution can be traced back to 1972.26
Defendants were charged with computer crimes under existing laws such as
trespass, burglary, and theft, because no specific computer crime statute
existed.27 Conceptually, the cyber world and physical world were different,
and courts struggled to find a satisfactory approach to prosecuting
computer crime.
Prosecution under a theft statute might have required a property
interest in the computer and a showing that the defendant’s misuse of the
computer deprived the owner of their property interest.28 In United States v.
23. Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94
MINN. L. REV 1561, 1564 (2010) (discussing Congressional intent for enacting a
computer crime statute in 1984).
24. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges at 1564 (defining federal interest).
25. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization”
in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1596, 1601 (2003) (questioning
why the “same one-size-fits-all prohibitions on unauthorized access” still govern in
light of rapid technological advancement since 1984 that has made a bright line
rule obsolete in the face of modern society).
26. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization”
in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1596, 1605 (2003).
27. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, at 1605.
28. Id. at 1609.
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Seidlitz,29 a former employee of a military contractor used a stolen
password, logged onto the company’s network, downloaded, and made a
copy of software. Identifying a property interest was easy: the company
owned the software and it was protected by password. Showing how, by
making a copy of the software, defendant depraved the company of the
software was difficult. The original copy remained in the company’s
possession, but it was clear the defendant’s action impacted the company’s
financial interests.30
Because of such trivialities, courts took a case-by-case, results-oriented
approach. If computer misuse caused harm, then property was taken and
defendants were liable.31 If misuse did not cause appreciable harm, then
property was not taken and defendants had not committed a crime.32 In
Seidlitz, the defendant intended to use the software for his own business.33
This would have caused the company that owned the software financial
harm by depriving it of a competitive advantage, and the Fourth Circuit
found him guilty of wire fraud.34
The pre-CFAA approach premised liability on an actual showing of
harm, evaluated case-by-case. If computer misuse passed a certain
threshold of harm, it was considered theft, and, prosecuted.35 If the
Government did not demonstrate that defendant’s conduct met the burden
of harm, the case was dismissed.36

B. 1984: First Computer Crime Legislation
The CFAA was codified as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984 and named the “Crime Fraud and Abuse Act” in 1986.37 In the
last 30 years, the CFAA has been amended five times. With each
amendment, the scope of the CFAA has been enlarged. In 1984, the CFAA
was a narrow and specific piece of legislation, limited to unauthorized
29. See United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978) (ruling that jury could
find defendant had fraudulent intent to use the information from plaintiff’s
computer system).
30. See Seidlitz, 589 F.2d at 160.
31. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope at 1611 (“Faced with such riddles, courts tended to
reach results-oriented outcomes”).
32. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, 1611.
33. See Seidlitz, 589 F.2d at 154 (“In June, 1975, Seidlitz resigned this job and
returned to work at his own computer firm in Alexandria, Virginia”).
34. Id. at 160.
35. See Seidlitz supra at note 30.
36. Compare Seidlitz with United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069 (1st Cir. 1997)
(“Curiosity on the part of an IRS officer may lead to dismissal, but curiosity alone
will not sustain a finding of participation in a felonious crime scheme to deprive
the IRS of its property”).
37. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges at 1564-1565 (discussing history of CFAA).
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access of a “federal interest” computer, defined as a computer that held
national security or financial information, or was property of the
Government.38
The first offense, codified at § 1030(a)(1), prohibited unauthorized
access to a computer for the purpose of obtaining national security
information with intent, or reason to believe, the information would be
used against the USA’s interests.39 The second offense, codified at
§1030(a)(2), prohibited unauthorized access to a computer to obtain
financial information from an institution or consumer reporting agency.40
The third offense, codified at §1030(a)(3) prohibited a person from
unauthorized access to a Government computer if doing so affected the
computer’s operation.41 The purpose of all three statutes was to protect
three specific Government interests.42
The next two amendments, in 1986 and 1994, brought additional
liabilities and a civil remedy, but the scope of the CFAA remained limited
to “federal interest computers”.43

C. 1996: Significant Expansion
Congress expanded the CFAA in three significant ways in 1996.
Congress’ intent was “addressing in a single statute the problem of
computer crime”.44 First, a new felony enhancement section for crime and
extortion was added. The two other changes created more significant legal
consequences. The scope of “unauthorized access” in 1030(a)(2) was
expanded beyond only financial information. And, the limitation to
“federal interest computer” was expanded to “protected computer.”45
The scope of 1030(a)(2), prohibiting unauthorized access to financial
information, was expanded to include unauthorized access to obtain any
information of any kind if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign

38. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges at 1564.
39. See 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1)-(a)(3) (1984).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges at 1564 (“All three statutes were tailored to a
specific government interest: national security, financial records, and government
property”).
43. Id. at 1564-1566; See also 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(4)-(6); See also 1030(g) (1994)
(allowing private cause of action to recover damages resulting from unauthorized
use).
44. S.REP. NO. 104-357, at 5 (1996) (“As intended when the law was originally
enacted, the Computer Fraud and Abuse statute facilitates addressing in a single
statute the problem of computer crime, rather than identifying and amending every
potentially applicable statute affected by advances in computer technology”).
45. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges at 1566-1567.
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communication.46 Finally, and most significantly, Congress expanded the
CFAA’s limitation to “federal interest computers” was expanded to
“protected computers.”47 A “protected computer” was defined to include
any computer “used in interstate or foreign commerce or
communication.”48 This gave the Government jurisdiction over virtually
any business’s computer that was connected to the Internet.49

D. Post 9-11
In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress
expanded the meaning of “protected computer” to include computers
outside the United States “used in a matter that affects interstate or foreign
commerce or communication of the United States.”50

E. 2008: Revisiting 1996
The requirement of an “interstate or foreign communication” as means
was removed from 1030(a)(2), so that, under 1030(a)(2)(C), any
unauthorized access to any protected computer that results in retrieval of
any information of any kind is covered by the CFAA.51
But, more importantly, the definition of “protected computer” was
again expanded. The word “or affecting” was added, and currently the
phrase now reads, “used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or
communication.”52 “Affecting interstate commerce” is a term of art,
showing Congressional intent as far as legally permissible under the
Commerce Clause. In application, the Commerce Clause gives the
Government power to “regulate purely local activities that are part of an
economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1568.
51. Id. at 1569.
52. Id.; See also18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(2)(B) (2008); See also 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(2)
(defining
protected
computer
to
include
any
computer:
“(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States
Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or
for a financial institution or the United States Government and the conduct
constituting the offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the
Government;
or
(B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication,
including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that
affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States”).
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commerce.”53 In effect, the CFAA has, almost blanket jurisdiction to
criminalize any form of unauthorized access.54
Throughout every revision, Congress expanded the scope of
unauthorized use, but Congress never defined authorization. Furthermore,
no exceptions were added, despite constant expansion of criminalization,
which engulfed previously innocuous actions. The result in the present day
is, that the CFAA is a blanket rule. Once triggered, its only constraint is
prosecutorial discretion. The remainder of this Note discusses issues arising
from this.

II. CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Defining Authorization
The Seventh Circuit interprets authorization more expansively than the
Ninth Circuit. The split emerged from employer-employee disputes about
when an employee acts without authorization or exceeds authorization. The
Seventh Circuit ruled that an employee’s authorization is terminated when
the employee’s actions violate a duty of loyalty owned to the employer.55
The Ninth Circuit has declined to interpret authorization so broadly.56
Because Congress has not defined authorization, the Ninth circuit
interpreted the word according to its common meaning. It ruled that an
employee’s authorization only ends if the employer revokes it, even if the
employee uses his authorization in a way that is harmful to the employer or
in violation of a state law.

B. The Seventh Circuit
In International Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin57 the Seventh Circuit
ruled that an employee’s use of his employer’s computer terminated his
authorized access because he used it in a way that violated a duty of loyalty
he owed the employer. Defendant Citrin was an employee of International
Airport Centers (“IAC”). He was given a laptop by IAC to perform his job
and was authorized to “return or destroy” data on the laptop before
returning it.58 Citrin quit and started a competing business. Before returning
the computer, Citrin deleted all data and uploaded a secure-erasure
53. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (ruling that Congress is allowed to
regulate marijuana grown for home use because the aggregate effect is to reduce
demand for marijuana in the national marijuana market).
54. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges at 1571 (concluding that after 2008, the CFAA
basically covers everything with a microchip).
55. See International Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
56. See LVRC Holdings L.L.C. v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009).
57. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419.
58. Id.
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program to prevent discovery and recovery of the files he deleted.59
IAC sued Citrin under the CFAA for, among other reasons,
intentionally accessing a protected computer without authorization or
exceeding authorization.60 Citrin argued that he was authorized to delete
files by IAC before returning the computer, and, therefore he did not
exceed authorization when he deleted the files and uploaded the secureerasure program.61 The District Court agreed and dismissed the case, but
the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Seventh Circuit reasoned
that it was unlikely IAC intended Citrin to destroy files that IAC did not
have duplicates of, or which would show Citrin’s misconduct.62 Citrin used
his authority to deprive IAC of something they wanted. This constituted a
breach of a duty of loyalty he owed IAC. Violating that duty triggered
termination of his authorized use of the computer.63

C. The Ninth Circuit
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Citrin implies that the manner in which
an employee uses his access can terminate his authorization. IAC did not
explicitly tell Citrin his access was terminated. Citrin’s use of the computer
terminated his authority because he covered up his misconduct.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow Citrin when it decided
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka.64 The Court implied that the CFAA is
primarily an access statute, not a use statute. It ruled that access could only
be terminated by the employer’s manifestations towards the employee, not
by the employee’s use, even if the employee violated a duty of loyalty
owed to the employer or a state law.65
LVRC Holdings (“LVRC”) operated a substance abuse rehabilitation
center. It hired Brekka to oversee Internet marketing programs.66 Brekka
had a personal business that provided consulting to rehabilitation centers.
In September 2003, using LVRC’s computer, Brekka emailed himself and
his wife LVRC usage statistics. The emailed documents included budget
information, patient admission reports, and names of past and current
patients. This is the type of information Brekka’s personal consulting
business provided to rehabilitation centers that competed with LVRC’s
center. In October 2003, Brekka left LVRC. A year later when LVRC
59. Id.
60. Id; See also 1030(a)(5)(A) (2008) (“intentionally causes damage without
authorization, to a protected computer”).
61. See Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419.
62. Id. at 421.
63. Id.
64. See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134.
65. Id. at 1135.
66. Id. at 1129.
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uncovered Brekka’s emails from September, they sued him under the
CFAA.67
LVRC alleged that, under Citrin, Brekka intentionally accessed its
computer without authorization, or, in excess of authorized access.68 The
District Court concluded Brekka had authorization because he was
employed by LVRC in September 2003 and LVRC did not present any
confidentiality agreement requiring Brekka to keep emailed documents
confidential.69 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed.
In rejecting Citrin, the Ninth Circuit interpreted authorization by the
word’s plain meaning because the CFAA does not define it. The plain
meaning of authorization is “permission or power granted by an
authority.”70 The Court concluded this meant authorization depended on
the employer’s action. Citrin’s interpretation did not comport to the plain
language because the Seventh Circuit interpreted authorization by the
manner in which the employee used his employer’s computer. In contrast,
the Ninth Circuit said an employee remains authorized to use a computer
even if the employee uses his authorization in a way that harms the
employer or breaks a state law because authorization is determined by the
employer’s assent of authorization to the employee.71
Brekka was authorized to use LVRC’s computer. He likely violated a
duty of loyalty to LVRC because he could, and likely did, give LVRC’s
information about potential and past patients to rival rehabilitation center
facilities. But the Ninth Circuit did not consider how Brekka used the
information as a factor. Therefore Brekka’s violation of his duty to LVRC
was inconsequential to whether or not he exceeded authorization.

D. Nosal: Brekka Applied
In United States v. Nosal,72 the Ninth Circuit applied Brekka to a
criminal case. The Court dismissed five counts of CFAA violations against
a former employee and his accomplices (together, the “defendants”)
because the Government failed to show that defendants’ accessing
confidential information on their employer’s network was without
authorization or in excess of authorized access.73 Nosal was a former
67. Id. at 1130.
68. Id.; See also 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2) (2008) (“ … intentionally accesses a computer
without authorization or exceeds authorized access …”); See also 1030(a)(4)
(2008) (“ … knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer
without authorization, or exceeds authorized access … “).
69. See Brekka 581 F.3d at 1132.
70. Id. at 1133.
71. Id.
72. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissing five counts of
unauthorized use under CFAA).
73. Id. at 856.
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executive at Korn/Ferry International (“Korn/Ferry”), an executive search
firm. He left Korn/Ferry to start a competing firm and asked three former
colleagues, who were still employed at Korn/Ferry, to access Korn/Ferry’s
computer system and give him confidential information consisting of
source lists, names, and client information.74
Nosal was argued before Brekka was decided. The Government argued
that Korn/Ferry’s computer use policy gave employees certain rights that,
when violated, resulted in exceeding authorized access. Presumably,
accessing confidential information with the intent to use it against
Korn/Ferry terminated their authorized use.75 Nosal argued that “exceeds
authorized access” refers to someone who is authorized to view only
certain information but views additional information he is unauthorized to
view.76 Initially, District Court rejected Nosal’s argument, but reversed and
dismissed after Brekka was decided.77 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
originally reversed the District Court, but granted an interlocutory appeal.
On review de novo, the Ninth Circuit re-instated the District Court’s
original judgment and dismissed all CFAA charges against Nosal.78
The Ninth Circuit declined the Government’s broader interpretation.
Specifically, the Court noted that Congress enacted the CFAA in 1984 to
deal with computer hacking, not with misappropriation of information or
with the breach of confidentiality agreements by employees.79 The
Government’s construction would have expanded the CFAA’s scope
beyond computer hacking and criminalized many innocuous computer uses
that people would have no reason to believe constitute a federal crime.80
Furthermore, employers could manipulate computer-use and personnel
policies traditionally governed by tort and contract law into policies
governed by criminal law. Since policies vary from company to company,
criminal liability could be premised on subjective standards.81
Here, like in Brekka, defendants had authorization to access the
information. The Court noted that the Government could prosecute Nosal
74. Id.
75. Id. at 857.
76. See Nosal 676 F.3d at 856.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 858 (“While the CFAA is susceptible to the government's broad
interpretation, we find Nosal's narrower one more plausible. Congress enacted the
CFAA in 1984 primarily to address the growing problem of computer hacking”).
80. Id. at 859 (“The government's construction of the statute would expand its scope
far beyond computer hacking to criminalize any unauthorized use of information
obtained from a computer. This would make criminals of large groups of people
who would have little reason to suspect they are committing a federal crime”).
81. Id. (generally discussing hypotheticals in which an employee may violate a
company policy, such as internet use, and be criminally liable for an innocuous act
such as visiting ESPN.com).
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and his accomplices on other charges, but not under the CFAA because
using the confidential information against Korn/Ferry’s interests did not
establish lack of authorization.

E. Solution to the Split
The CFAA is not an effective statute because it can be interpreted in
two equally plausible ways. The Supreme Court should adopt Brekka
because it is the more narrow reading of the law and the vagueness
doctrine82 requires courts to reject the broader view of authorization in
Citrin.83
Adopting Brekka would eliminate vagueness as to what authorization
means. The vagueness doctrine requires the legislature to establish general
guidelines.84 Establishing the literal definition of “authorization” would
create a clear guideline for law enforcement. Citrin fails to do this because
it would criminalize millions of innocuous acts by turning everyday
computer use into a potential crime.85 On the other hand, Brekka would
exclude routine employee computer use from criminal liability.86
Furthermore, interpreting authorization by its literal meaning is most
fair to defendants.87 Brekka would put responsibility on employers to
clearly define rules and enforce them through tort and contract law in civil
court.88 Under Citrin, employers would have an unfair advantage in
disputes with employees, because along with a civil remedy, they would
have the force of criminal enforcement for subjective circumstances
82. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (establishing that vagueness
doctrine does not require actual notice, only that “legislature establish general
guidelines to govern law enforcement”).
83. Kerr, Cybercrime Vagueness at 23-24 (arguing that courts should adapt Nosal).
84. See Lawson, 461 U.S. at 361 (ruling that a California statute requiring loiterers to
carry “credible and reliable” identification violated the due process clause because
it did not clarify what satisfies “credible and reliable identification” thereby
facilitating arbitrary law enforcement).
85. See Kerr, Cybercrime Vagueness at 25 (concluding that routine employee use for
personal reasons would renter a criminal anyone who even for one second uses
their computer in a way not benefitting the employer).
86. Id. (reasoning that it is unrealistic to have a rule criminalizing all use against the
employer’s interest because virtually every person uses their employer’s computer
for personal use, and an instantaneous unauthorized use should not trigger criminal
liability).
87. See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134 (“The Supreme Court has long warned against
interpreting criminal statutes in surprising and novel ways that impose unexpected
burdens on defendants”).
88. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859 (“(“Employer-employee and company-consumer
relationships are traditionally governed by tort and contract law; the government's
proposed interpretation of the CFAA allows private parties to manipulate their
computer-use and personnel policies so as to turn these relationships into ones
policed by the criminal law”).
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traditionally governed by tort and contract law.89
A narrower interpretation of authority would reduce overcharge. Nosal
was charged with over twenty counts, and five were dismissed because
they were CFAA charges.90 In situations such as Nosal, the prosecution
could stack the case against a defendant by overcharging him.91 This would
lead to the defendant facing a higher prison term under the federal
sentencing guidelines. The prosecution could then offer a plea deal and
pressure defendant into taking it.92
Finally, Brekka’s reading is closer to Congressional intent. In 1984,
Congress intended to address computer hacking, not employer-employee
disputes.93 If Congress intended conduct like Nosal’s to be criminally liable
under the CFAA, it should act.

III. A BRIGHT LINE AND A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
A. The Need for Congressional Reform
The CFAA is over-inclusive for two reasons. First, as stated in the
preceding section, it criminalizes innocuous crimes. Second, it does not
have exceptions permitting certain classes of persons or excluding certain
types of infractions. Currently, the only filter on the CFAA is prosecutorial
discretion. This is not assuring, because it’s not clear the Government, or at
least every individual prosecutor, can be trusted to make a responsible,
sense-making, and unbiased decision in every case.94
The Supreme Court can solve the first problem by solving the Circuit
Split in favor of Brekka. The Court cannot solve the second. That requires
Congressional action to amend the CFAA.

B. Lack of Exceptions
89. Id.
90. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges at 1587 (using Nosal as an example of prosecutorial
overreach because the CFAA’s vagueness allows prosecution “based on aggressive
readings of the statute”.
91. Id.
92. This is discussed in Section II, and suggests that Swartz was overcharged and
pressured to accept a plea.
93. See Nosal 676 F.3d at 858 (“The government agrees that the CFAA was concerned
with hacking, which is why it also prohibits accessing a computer “without
authorization.” According to the government, that prohibition applies to hackers,
so the “exceeds authorized access” prohibition must apply to people who are
authorized to use the computer, but do so for an unauthorized purpose”).
94. Judge Kozinski, Chief Judge of the Ninth District expressed this in Nosal at
562(“The government assures us that, whatever the scope of the CFAA, it won't
prosecute minor violations. But we shouldn't have to live at the mercy of our local
prosecutor. … And it's not clear we can trust the government when a tempting
target comes along”).
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The CFAA can be reduced to a bright-line rule drawn around a box: if
a person has no authorization to open the box, or exceeds authorization,
then access to information inside the box is outlawed.95 But authorization is
subject to interpretation, especially in a networked environment.96 For this
reason, unless the unauthorized access is done with malice or involve
matters of national security,97 disputes regarding “authorization” under the
CFAA are best left to be disputed in civil court between the parties
involved. Those parties are best able to address the malleable aspects of
authorization.
Authorization is malleable because it is not expressed the same
universally. Terms of service, pop-ups, cultural expectations, and
employment contracts are all different ways authorization may be
conveyed, or revoked.98 Outside of the computer context, disregarding any
of them might not be a crime, or even a civil offense.99 But, in drawing a
bright line rule around the box the CFAA protects the box’s contents
regardless of social values or other existing laws about the information in
the box.
Such a rigid law is generally against social convention. Other laws
regarding right to information balance protection of information with social
goods.100 For example, copyright law protects the copyright holder but
makes an exception for fair use.101 Trade secrets protect against
misappropriation and must be specifically defined. Classified information
is marked, but cultural and legal history permits journalists and news
outlets to report on its issues without prosecution.102
95. Jennifer Garnick, Towards Learning from Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2, THE
CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY (Jan. 15, 2013 3:54 PM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/01/towards-learning-losing-aaron-swartzpart-2 (interpreting the CFAA as a bright-line rule around a box with no regard for
what’s in the box, even if it includes otherwise public data); See also supra note 25
at 4.
96. Id.
97. See 18 U.S.C. 1030(d)(2) (2008) (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have
primary authority to investigate offenses under subsection (a)(1) for any cases
involving espionage, foreign counterintelligence, information protected against
unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or
Restricted Data … “).
98. Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (writing from her experience as a former
criminal defense lawyer).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id; See also New York Times Co. vs. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (ruling
that the New York Times could publish the Pentagon Papers, which were still
classified at the time, without risk of censorship and punishment. This overruled
President Richard Nixon’s claimed executive authority to prevent the New York
Times from publishing classified information in its possession).
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The Supreme Court ruling in favor of Brekka will not address the
CFAA’s rigidity. Under Brekka, if a person does not have authorization, or
mistakenly goes beyond their authorization on a network, they may have
committed a federal crime, despite having done an innocuous thing.103
Brekka would eliminate vagueness and concretely define authorization, but
it would not create an exception for situations when use is unauthorized but
does not rise to the level of criminality. For these reasons, Congress must
step in and create an exception.

C. Prosecutorial Discretion
CFAA criminal prosecution inherently lends itself to abuse of
prosecutorial discretion.104 The problem is two-fold – part human and part
systematic. Prosecutors decide in each case whether to charge a person, and
if so, with what charges.105 The other problem is systematic: federal
sentencing is determined by federal sentencing guidelines.106 In practice,
the guidelines set “draconian sentences”107 that almost always increase
upwards and never down.
CFAA sentencing is determined according to a calculation of loss
incurred. Sentences are more harsh and unpredictable than in other federal
cases because the CFAA’s definition of loss is very broad and not limited
to foreseeable damages.108 Furthermore, the prosecution’s burden of proof
103. See Stephen L. Carter, The Overzealous Prosecution of Aaron Swartz, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (Jan. 17, 2013 6:30 PM ), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-0117/the-overzealous-prosecution-of-aaron-swartz (giving an example of how, if a
workplace policy does not allow internet access for any personal use, and an
employee accesses their bank account at work to pay a bill, they’ve committed a
felony under the CFAA because they’ve exceeded their authorized use); See
generally Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope at 1650-1651 (Discussing how in contrast to
current law, his proposal would limit scope of unauthorized access, and laws
“would no longer threaten to transform disagreements with computer owners into
criminal violations”).
104. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (“Voluminous, overlapping charges
may be typical …) See generally Kerr, The Criminal Charges Against Aaron
Swartz (Part 2: Prosecutorial Discretion), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16,
2013 11:34 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/16/the-criminal-chargesagainst-aaron-swartz-part-2-prosecutorial-discretion/ (discussing that in general,
the charges against Swartz were not outside the usual conduct of prosecutors, who
overcharge defendants to induce plea deals).
105 See Kerr, Criminal Charges Against Swartz, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14,
2013 2:50 AM) http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/14/aaron-swartz-charges/ (“The
DOJ has the discretion to charge cases or not, and prosecutors can agree to
different plea deals or even agree to have charges dismissed”).
106. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (discussing federal sentencing based on
her experiences as a criminal defense attorney and according to federal sentencing
guidelines).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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is very low.109 The effect is that, many defendants are cornered into
accepting a plea deal as their only rational legal option, rather than opt for a
trial and risk significant prison time and more expenses.

D. Overcharge
In many typical federal cases, the Government overcharges the
defendant.110 The prosecution then offers the defendant a deal: plead guilty
to a felony and waive the right to appeal in return for the prosecution’s
suggesting a significantly reduced sentence.111 If the defendant refuses the
offer, the prosecutor typically returns to the grand jury and adds more
charges. Many times, charges overlap and add more potential prison
time.112
Overcharging gives the prosecution an unfair advantage. The defendant
must defend against every charge, but the Government often needs to prove
only one charge to obtain the maximum sentence.113 Furthermore,
overcharging is likely to predispose the jury to find the defendant guilty
because jurors are more likely to infer the defendant’s guilt from the sheer
volume of charges against him.114 A case tried under the CFAA often
requires lay jurors to understand technology, physics, and economic
concepts that are outside of common knowledge.115 The jury’s
predisposition towards the prosecution, and likely layman knowledge of
disciplines a jury must grasp well if the defendant is to be successful,
reduces the defendant’s chance of acquittal even more.116

E. Federal Sentencing
A high flexibility in calculating loss and a low standard of proof give
the prosecution unfettered discretion to successfully argue for higher or
lower sentences. Federal sentences are usually determined by federal
109. Id.
110. Id (“Voluminous overlapping charges may be typical, but they can give unfair
advantage to the prosecution”); See also Orin Kerr, The Criminal Charges Against
Aaron Swartz (Part 2: Prosecutorial Discretion), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan.
16, 2013 11:34 PM) http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/16/the-criminal-chargesagainst-aaron-swartz-part-2-prosecutorial-discretion/ (writing that overcharge is a
frequent tactic used by prosecutors to scare defendants into pleading guilty).
111. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (drawing conclusions based on her
experiences defending criminal defendants under information statues, including the
CFAA).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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sentencing guidelines in proportion to defendant’s past record and the
offense characteristics.117 CFAA sentencing is harsher and less predictable
than sentencing under other federal statutes because CFAA sentencing is
determined by loss. Loss is defined as reasonable loss to any victim, and is
not capped to foreseeable damages.118 This is in contrast to similar nonCFAA fraud crimes, to which guidelines include only reasonable
foreseeable monetary harm.119 The prosecution in a CFAA case can
calculate loss as narrowly or as broadly as it wants.
The standard of proof to show loss is low. Federal sentencing is
generally done by preponderance of evidence.120 A judge need only make a
“reasonable estimate of loss.” Since the prosecution may find a wide range
of reasonable loss in any given case, sentencing unpredictable.121

F. Overall Effect
The practical effect of overcharge and sentencing guidelines is to
pressure the defendant into accepting the prosecution’s plea deal. Many
innocent persons plead guilty because it is the most rational choice given
the odds, even if it means serving prison time.122 Often, the plea deal is so
reduced, that the difference between risking trial and accepting a plea deal
could be the risk of serving a few years in prison versus serving a few
months.

G. Applied to Swartz
Recall that Swartz hacked into JSTOR, from MIT’s computer system,
and downloaded millions of articles from JSTOR’s secure servers.123
Swartz’ prosecution followed the pattern outlined above. Prosecutors filed
duplicative charges124 carrying up to 50 years in prison.125 Then,
117. Id.
118. Id.; See also 1030(d)(12) (“the term ‘loss’ means any reasonable cost to any
victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage
assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition
prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential
damages incurred because of interruption of service”).
119. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (explaining how loss is calculated in a
typical CFAA pleading).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (implying many innocent persons plead
guilty to not risk a significant amount of prison time).
123. See Introduction.
124. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2(stating she, and others, believe Swartz
was overcharged); See also supra note 14 at 2.
125. See Introduction.
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prosecutors offered a plea deal. Supposedly, Swartz had three options: 1.
plead guilty to 13 felonies and the Government would argue a six month
prison term and Swartz’ lawyer could have argued for less; 2. plead guilty
to all 13 felonies and the Government would have argued a 4 month
sentence; or 3. risk trial, and the Government would argue for seven
years.126

H. Swartz Overcharged
Swartz was likely overcharged for two reasons. First, the discrepancy
between prison-time recommended by the Government if Swartz went to
trial versus if he took a plea deal. Second, the Government’s calculation of
loss.
The plea deal was coercive. If Swartz took the deal, the Government
would have argued for 4 or 6 months incarceration. If he went to trial, the
Government would have argued for 7 years. Some say Swartz should have
pled guilty.127 But the lenient offer ignores the unaccounted cost of being a
convicted felon. Often, felons face social stigma, loss of job opportunities,
and loss of voting rights, which they may never gain again.128 Furthermore,
the judge is not restricted to the Government’s sentencing suggestion.
Pleading guilty to a felony would have meant Swartz was facing at least 5
years prison time according to the sentencing guidelines. Even if the
Government argued four to six months, Swartz had no absolute guarantee
he would only have served that much.129
Second, the Government’s calculation of loss could have ranged from
a few thousand dollars to millions of dollars. The Government alleged that
JSTOR’s information was “valued in the tens of thousands of dollars at the
time.”130 Swartz downloaded around 4.8 million articles from JSTOR. The
cost to download was $19.00. The Government could have argued Swartz
caused anywhere from $10,000 to $91 million in damages to JSTOR.131
The practical result is that, the spectrum of loss calculations would
have allowed the Government to argue for any sentence it wanted, and
likely convince a jury by a preponderance of evidence.132 Furthermore, the
Government ignored the fact that Swartz had settled out of court with
JSTOR.

126. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (commenting on alleged plea bargains
Swartz was offered by the prosecution).
127. See supra note 16, at 2.
128. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (discussing extrajudicial reasons
defendants have for not pleading to a much lesser sentence).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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On June 3, 2011, Swartz and JSTOR entered into a civil agreement.133
Pursuant to the agreement, Swartz certified that he made no copies of the
downloaded files. He delivered the only existing disk of the files to
JSTOR’s attorneys, who delivered the disk to the United States Attorney’s
Office. Furthermore, Swartz paid $1,500 in damages and $25,000 in
attorneys’ fees.134 Afterwards, JSTOR considered the matter closed, and
publicly declared its preference that Swartz not be charged. On July 19,
2011, Swartz’ federal indictment was unsealed135 and JSTOR was one of
the parties subpoenaed. In response, JSTOR issued the following public
statement: “As noted previously, our interest was in securing the content.
Once this was achieved, we had no interest in this becoming an ongoing
legal matter …”136 Up until Swartz’ suicide, JSTOR’s attorneys contacted
lead prosecutor Carmen Ortiz numerous times, reaffirming their wishes that
charges against Swartz be dropped.137
Swartz was charged regardless of his intent, the operational reality of
his actions, or the relationship between him and JSTOR - extrajudicial
realities that should have mitigated the force of the Government’s
prosecution.

IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. Reform
It is inequitable and unconscionable for a hacker like Swartz to be
charged without taking into account the operational reality of his actions.
He returned the copied materials and settled out of court. In return, JSTOR
publicly campaigned for charges to be dismissed. JSTOR’s public actions
suggest that there are societal conventions that the prosecutors should have
taken notice of, but did not.
The CFAA is a bright line rule around a box. Once triggered, it does
not take notice of the contents inside the box, or who is entitled to them. In
this case, JSTOR was the owner of the box, but liability was triggered,
regardless of JSTOR’s wishes. Rather than a bright line rule governed by
prosecutorial discretion, the CFAA should create a bright line exception to
a general rule stating that in order for criminal liability to be established, an
infraction must pass a certain threshold.138 If the infraction does not pass
133. Report to the President MIT and the Prosecution of Aaron Swarz at 41-42,
http://swartz-report.mit.edu/docs/report-to-the-president.pdf
(last
accessed
December 19, 2013) (recounting Swartz’ plea with JSTOR in a comprehensive
MIT investigative report about the incident).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See generally Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope at 1648-1649 (suggesting similar mindset
to a proposed restructuring of the CFAA).
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the threshold, then legal remedies should be limited to civil litigation.
Congress should change the CFAA, either through amendment, or new
legislation. A suggestion is the “Hacker’s Rule” discussed below.

B. The Hacker’s Rule
The Hacker’s Rule proposition is a two-part rule that abolishes the
current bright line rule. Recall that the current rule establishes criminal
prosecution whenever a person uses a computer without authorization, or
exceeds authorization. The Hacker’s Rule would create an exception for
when a person who uses a computer without authorization, or exceeds
authorization is not criminally liable.139 A hacker would be criminally
liable if he: 1) acts with malicious intent or 2) if no malicious intent or no
federal interest, then his unauthorized intrusion was reckless enough that,
regardless of any civil or extrajudicial settlement with the injured party,
traditional criminal conventions would seek to punish.

C. Malicious Intent
Professor Orin Kerr stated the charges against Swartz were “pretty
much what any good federal prosecutor would have charged.”140 At the
same time, Kerr recognized that Swartz’ case demonstrates that criminal
prosecution under the CFAA is triggered too quickly. Kerr wrote that “[t]he
law needs to draw a distinction between low-level crimes and more serious
crimes, and current law does so poorly”141
Privacy and computer security activist Chris Soghoian, a senior policy
analyst at the American Civil Liberties Union, suggests that existing law
needs to differentiate between malicious, and non-malicious intrusions by
hackers for the purpose of showing off their skill or spreading information
they believe should be available publicly.142

D. Reckless Use
The second part of the Hacker’s Rule creates a general rule, that if the
139. The Hacker’s Rule is a proposition for criminal offenses and does not preclude
civil liability triggered due to a breach of terms, an employment contract, or other
infraction by which the user accessed the computer without authorization.
140. See supra note 20, at 3.
141. Orin Kerr, The Criminal Charges Against Aaron Swartz (Part 2: prosecutorial
Discretion), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 2013 11:34 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/16/the-criminal-charges-against-aaron-swartzpart-2-prosecutorial-discretion/.
142. See Daniel Wagner and Verona Dobnik, Swartz’ Death Fuels Debate Over
Computer
Crime,
THE
BIG
STORY
(Jan
13,
2013),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/swartz-death-fuels-debate-over-computer-crime
(discussing policy experts’ opinions).
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hacker’s intent is not malicious, the prosecution must show it was,
nevertheless, reckless enough that the person should be punished, even if,
the person settled with the injured party. Furthermore, this part creates a
bright line exception to the general rule of recklessness, that if the conduct
is contrary to a federal interest, then the person is prosecuted.
Congress would have to define federal interest. A place to start is in §
1030(d)(2) of the CFAA. That section lists instances, involving national
security issues that the FBI may investigate.143 Congress could combine
this with the original definition of federal interest.144 A possible new
definition of federal interest could be: unauthorized access to national
interest information, personal financial information, Government owned
computers or a violation of §1030(d)(2). This would be the bright line
exception that automatically triggers liability. The rest would be evaluated
case by case.145 The Government would have the burden of showing that an
outcome reached between two parties, such as the settlement between
Swartz and JSTOR is inequitable.

E. Application to Swartz
It is unlikely that Swartz would have been prosecuted under the
proposed Hacker Rule. First, Swartz did not have malicious intent.146
Second, the damage he caused was sufficiently cured by his extrajudicial
agreement with JSTOR and was not reckless enough that traditional
criminal sanctions should seek to punish.147

F. Swartz’ Conduct
Applying the first prong, Swartz did not have any malicious intent. The

143. See CFAA 1030(d)(2) (2008) (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have
primary authority to investigate offenses under subsection (a)(1) for any cases
involving espionage, foreign counterintelligence, information protected against
unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations”).
144. Federal interest was originally defined as a computer that held national security, or
financial information, or was property of the government. See Section I(A) supra
at 6.
145. See Section I(A) supra at 5-6.
146. See James Boyce, The Prosecution of Aaron Swartz: A Reply to Orin Kerr, THE
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Jan.
18,
2013
10:00
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-boyle/prosecution-aaronswartz_b_2508242.html (implying that, given Swartz’ motivation for past projects,
he was likely motivated by his desire to do what he considered a public good).
147. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, at 1656-7 (discussing traditional theories of
punishment).
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Government alleged he accessed JSTOR with intent to defraud148 , but
Swartz’ mental state suggested otherwise.149 Even if the Government
argued that, Swartz’ download could have deprived JSTOR of a
competitive advantage in attracting customers to sign up, Swartz’ intent
was not to enter the online journal database market with articles
downloaded from JSTOR.150

G. Damage is Curable by Extrajudicial Agreement with JSTOR
As mentioned above, Swartz and JSTOR reached a civil settlement. As
part of the settlement, Swartz paid monetary damages and gave a disk of
the files he downloaded to JSTOR’s attorneys. The attorneys then handed
the disk to the Department of Justice. This is an equitable solution.
JSTOR’S primary concern was the whereabouts of the data. Also, they
were compensated for their troubles. There was no future threat because
Swartz returned the files and declared he had not kept a copy for himself.
In return, JSTOR had shown good faith and publicly supported him.
Traditionally, criminal liability is limited in scope to conduct that
satisfies utilitarian and retributive goals.151 Utilitarianism seeks to punish a
defendant in a way that is also beneficial to society, and goals include
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.152 The retributive goal is to
align the scope of criminal activity with societal values of justice.153 For
computer crime, the most important is deterrence.154 Criminal prosecution
should benefit society by discouraging future harmful conduct.155 JSTOR’s
148. See Grand Jury Indictment, U.S. v. Aaron Swartz, 1:11-cr-10260-NMG at 10, (D.
Mass.,
filed
Sep.
12,
2012),
available
at
http://tech.mit.edu/V132/N40/aaronsw/superseding-indictment.pdf
(alleging
Swartz sought to defraud by concealing his identity on the network).
149. See Lawrence Lessig, Prosecution as a Bully, (Jan. 13, 2013).
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-01-17/the-overzealous-prosecutionof-aaron-swartz (offering possible mental state of Swartz by rebuking the notion
that academic journals are a profitable endeavor with strong language, and,
pointing out that many of Swartz’ projects, such as Reddit and Creative Commons,
were done with the mindset of building a free service for users).
150. See generally Section I(A) discussing Seidlitz at 4. There, the defendant intended
to use copied material in his own business; See generally Section II. Citrin,
Brekka, and Nosal all involved defendants who intended to use information in a
competing business. There, an allegation of the plaintiffs was intention to defraud
by exceeding authorized access. Here, the facts are distinguished because Swartz
did not intend to enter a for-profit business with the articles he downloaded.
151. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, at 1656-1657 (applying traditional theories of
criminal punishment to computer crimes).
152. Id at 1656.
153. Id at 1657.
154. Id at 1656.
155. Id.
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public support of Swartz is an indication that there might not be a societal
benefit from prosecuting him.
The Government did not have a clear federal interest. Swartz did not
hack into a financial institution, or a Government computer, or compromise
national security. The articles Swartz downloaded were academic, and
available to anyone who wished to sign up for JSTOR’s services.156 The
Government would have been unlikely to show Swartz was so reckless as
to be charged criminally in order to deter future behavior or correct a
wrong, as the Hacker’s Rule would require.
The Government would have had the burden to show that Swartz’
actions were reckless enough that there is a societal interest in prosecuting
him. What is reckless requires a case-by-case analysis.157 For example, a
person who hacks into a school’s security camera system as a prank may
reach a settlement with the school (or, be expelled), but the act
compromised the school’s safety during the time the system was off,
whether or not intended. Society has an interest to deter future conduct
because other persons were put at risk. The action is reckless and incurable
by a settlement.
Swartz’ action may have been inconsiderate of other JSTOR users
whose ability to use JSTOR was hampered, but this is a matter of
inconvenience limited to only JSTOR users, and did not pose a danger to
anyone. If JSTOR subscribers had been severely affected by Swartz’
actions, they could have filed a civil suit. Columbia Law professor Tim Wu
summarized Swartz’ case best, writing: " … was no actual physical harm,
nor actual economic harm. The leak was found and plugged; JSTOR
suffered no actual economic loss. It did not press charges. Like a pie in the
face, Swartz’s act was annoying to its victim, but of no lasting
consequence."158

H. Other Tests
As mentioned above, Brekka would be one solution to narrowing the
CFAA’s scope. As Nosal demonstrated, Brekka can limit the scope of a
criminal prosecution, but Brekka does not create an exempt class of users.
Under Brekka, a user like Swartz would be liable for criminal prosecution
because he accessed JSTOR without authorization.159 Brekka is narrowing
of the CFAA through clarification but is still a bright line rule.
156. See Lessig, Prosecution as a Bully; See generally http://about.jstor.org/ (last
accessed March 17, 2014).
157. See supra discussion in Part I at 5.
158. Tim Wu, How the Legal System Failed Aaron Swartz – And us, THE NEW YORKER
(Jan.
14,
2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/everyone-interestingis-a-felon.html.
159. See generally Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz (hypothesizing that under Brekka,
Swartz exceeded authorization because MIT had blacklisted his laptop and in
response Swartz concealed his identity).
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Professor Kerr has postulated a rule based on code-circumvention.
Kerr defines access “without authorization” to mean circumventing coderestrictions. The practical effect would be to reduce the scope of
unauthorized access statutes.160 A person would be criminally liable only if
they circumvent a computer code to gain access to information. If they just
violate the terms of service, or a private contract, no criminal liability is
triggered. Kerr’s proposal would filter out innocuous use and disagreement
among parties from criminal liability.
Kerr gives an example of, a pro-life owner of a computer network
inserting a clause in the terms of agreement that only pro-life opinions may
be expressed on the network.161 He concludes that, a pro-choice opinion
would violate the terms of use, “making the access ‘without authorization’
or ‘exceeding authorized access’ and triggering criminal liability.”162 This
is exactly the type of deficiency in criminal liability that the Hacker’s Rule
would correct. Expressing those views might result in a person’s access
from the network being rescinded,163 but the infraction would fall short of
recognizable malice, a federal interest, or be considered reckless to trigger
criminal liability.
It is unlikely Kerr’s proposal would have prevented Swartz’
prosecution.164 The indictment stated MIT had blocked Swartz’ laptop’s
MAC address.165 Swartz spoofed his MAC address to gain re-entry into the
network. The effect was to trick the network into thinking a different
computer was accessing it. Although not a literal code circumvention,
Swartz’ action was in response to MIT’s restriction on his use, based on his
computer’s unique code.

CONCLUSION
The CFAA should be reformed for two reasons. First, innocuous acts
are criminalized. Second, in contradiction to the general framework of law,
the CFAA does not exempt any class of user or type of use.
Consequentially, the CFAA is prone to prosecutorial abuse, because there
are no specific guidelines, only a bright line rule.
The author of this Note is sympathetic towards Aaron Swartz. His
160. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope at 1649.
161. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope at 1658.
162. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope at 1659.
163. For example, if it is a web forum, the person’s IP address may be blocked.
164. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz (skeptical that Swartz would have escaped
prosecution under Kerr’s rule because Swartz repeatedly spoofed his MAC address
on MIT’s network).
165. A Mac address is a computer’s unique physical address. When a computer is
connected to the Internet, the IP address is related to the MAC address on the local
area network.
See http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/definition/MACaddress.
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suicide prevented a legal conclusion to his prosecution, but it should not
detract from the deficiencies in the CFAA, and the socially unjust
consequences that hold true regardless of Swartz’ choice. The legal
relevance is the charges he was facing, and the law behind them, not his
reaction to them. Had Swartz lived, the purpose of this Note would have
remained the same. The conclusions made are not intended to be an
absolute solution, and not everyone will agree with the views presented.
But, as the literature on the subject has shown, legal scholars agree that the
CFAA is in need of reform. Ultimately, this Note seeks to raise awareness
about this issue, and encourage further thinking and action.
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